The SPV, special purpose vehicle, is one of the most over-marketed and under-understood structures in private investing. Operators encounter SPVs constantly: as a way to invest in a single deal, as a layer in a fund-of-funds, as a vehicle for syndicated co-investments. Most operators sign without understanding what they’re actually inside.

What an SPV is, in plain language

An SPV is a stand-alone legal entity, usually an LLC, created to hold a single investment or pool capital for a single purpose. It exists to isolate liability, to consolidate many small investors into a single line on a target company’s cap table, and to give the SPV sponsor administrative control over voting, distributions, and reporting.

The structural questions that actually matter

• Who’s the sponsor / manager? They control distributions, information flow, voting on follow-ons, and any decision to exit. Their track record and incentives matter more than the underlying asset.
• Fee structure. Most SPVs charge a one-time management fee (1–2% of capital, sometimes higher) and carried interest (typically 10–20%). High-quality syndicates compress fees; low-quality ones layer them.
• Information rights. Some SPVs pass through everything from the underlying company. Others pass through quarterly summaries. Operators investing $250k+ should expect direct underlying-company access.
• Drag/tag rights. If the target gets acquired, can the SPV drag you along? If the sponsor wants to sell their position, do you have tag-along rights? These are negotiable but often skipped.
• Liquidity. SPVs are illiquid by default. Secondary sale rights are usually subject to sponsor approval. Plan for the position to stay for years.

Where SPVs are misused

Two patterns to watch: SPVs created primarily for the sponsor’s fees rather than the LP’s economics, and SPVs that stack on top of other SPVs (creating fee layering you’ll only notice in the K-1). Neither is necessarily wrong, but both deserve direct questions.

The operator read

An SPV is a wrapper. Whether it’s a good wrapper depends on the asset inside, the sponsor running it, and the structural details most investors don’t read. Read the docs. Always.

“Operating partner” sits inside almost every private equity firm above a certain size, but the role can mean five different things depending on the firm. Operators who hear the title in a conversation should be asking which version they’re talking to, the answer changes how seriously to take the firm’s value-add claims.

The five flavors

1. The functional expert. Senior leader, often former CEO or CFO of a portfolio company exit, retained by the firm to provide deep functional support across the portfolio. Sales operations, pricing strategy, supply chain, whatever their specialty is. Engaged on demand. Real.
2. The interim executive. Parachuted into a portfolio company when something breaks. Lives there for 6–18 months. Less common in the lower middle market; more common in turnarounds.
3. The board chair. Sits on portfolio company boards. Coaches the CEO. May lead diligence on add-ons. Influence is real but indirect.
4. The deal-source / network player. Title is “operating partner,” function is business development. Brings deal flow and operating relationships. Adds value via introductions more than execution.
5. The marketing veneer. Honorary title given to a well-known operator with limited day-to-day involvement. Their name lifts the fund’s credibility with LPs; their actual time commitment is minimal.

How to tell which flavor you’re getting

Three questions, asked directly:

• “In the last 12 months, what’s the longest meeting you’ve had with a portfolio company executive?”
• “Which decisions in the portfolio do you personally drive, versus advise on?”
• “How is your compensation tied to portfolio outcomes versus fund management fees?”

The answers usually sort the flavor in 60 seconds.

The operator read

Operating partners are real assets when they’re real operators, and marketing copy when they’re not. The title alone tells you nothing. The diligence tells you everything.

Most LPs in private funds focus on two numbers: management fee and carried interest. Both matter, but neither tells you what the actual cash distribution will look like over the fund’s life. The waterfall does, and waterfalls vary in ways that change LP outcomes by hundreds of basis points.

The standard American waterfall

In a typical “deal-by-deal” American waterfall, each individual investment runs its own distribution math:

1. Return of capital. LPs get back the invested capital plus a pro-rata share of fund expenses on that deal.
2. Preferred return. LPs receive a “hurdle” (usually 8%) on that capital before the GP earns anything.
3. GP catch-up. The GP receives 100% of distributions until the GP has caught up to its carry split (commonly 20% of profits to that point).
4. Carry split. Remaining profits split 80/20 (or whatever the agreed share is) between LPs and GP.

The European (whole-fund) variant

In a European waterfall, GPs receive no carry until LPs receive back all committed capital plus their preferred return across the entire fund. This is more LP-friendly and typical of institutional funds.

Where the real economics hide

• Clawback. If the GP takes carry early on winners and the later deals lose, does the GP have to return the carry? “Yes, with interest” reads differently from “yes, net of taxes.” Read it.
• Cross-collateralization. In deal-by-deal waterfalls, losses on Deal A may not offset gains on Deal B for carry purposes. This can dramatically favor the GP.
• Treatment of management fees. Are management fees applied against the preferred return calculation, or not? It matters more than most LPs realize.
• Tier definitions. Some funds layer multiple hurdles (8% then 12% then no cap). Each tier shifts who gets the next dollar.

The operator read

The cheapest GP isn’t the one with the lowest carry headline. It’s the one whose waterfall geometry favors LPs in the realistic, not the upside, scenario. Model the waterfall at your expected outcome, not the marketing case.

Continuation funds, vehicles that buy out existing private equity fund holdings to extend the holding period of certain trophy assets, were a niche structure five years ago. Today they account for a meaningful share of private-equity secondary volume, and the trend is reshaping how LPs think about liquidity.

The mechanics

A typical continuation vehicle works like this: a sponsor identifies one or several portfolio companies they want to hold beyond the original fund’s term. Rather than force a sale or extend the fund, they create a new vehicle, raise capital from new (often secondary-focused) LPs, and use that capital to buy the position from the original fund at a third-party-validated valuation. Existing LPs choose between rolling into the new vehicle or cashing out.

Why this exists

• Best assets don’t want to be sold on a calendar. Many of the most valuable portfolio companies are still compounding when the fund clock runs out.
• LP liquidity preferences vary. Endowments and sovereigns may want to hold; pensions with funding pressure may want out.
• Secondary capital is patient. Specialized secondary funds price these trades aggressively because the underlying assets are de-risked relative to a primary commitment.

The structural questions

For operators considering a continuation vehicle (as new LP, rolling LP, or interested observer): what’s the discount or premium to the prior NAV mark? How was the price set, and by whom? What are the new economics, is the carry waterfall the same, reset, or sweetened? What’s the new holding period?

The honest critique

Continuation vehicles aren’t free of conflict. The sponsor is on both sides of the trade, selling out of one fund and buying into another. Best-in-class processes use independent advisors, formal LP advisory committee sign-off, and competitive secondary market pricing. Anything less is structurally suspect.

The operator read

Continuation vehicles are a useful structure for specific situations. They’re also a useful test of a sponsor’s governance hygiene. How a GP handles the cross-fund trade tells you what they’ll do when the conflict is less visible.

Most LP disputes with GPs do not start with carried interest. They start with a line item on the K-1 that reads “fund expenses” and carries a number nobody modeled. Understanding what belongs in that bucket, what legitimately stays in the management fee, and why the boundary between the two shifts across fund vintages and GP negotiating cycles is foundational literacy for anyone allocating into private structures.

What the Management Fee Is Supposed to Cover

The management fee, typically 1.5 to 2 percent of committed capital during the investment period, exists to run the GP’s operations: salaries, rent, basic technology, investor relations staff. The implicit deal is that LPs pay a flat drag on committed capital, and the GP absorbs its overhead. That was the original architecture.

The complication is that “operations” is not a legal term. In practice, the management fee covers whatever the LPA does not explicitly exclude. Sophisticated LPs began pushing in the mid-2000s for offsets, where transaction fees and monitoring fees earned from portfolio companies flow back to reduce the management fee. The standard offset is now 80 percent, though institutional LPs at larger funds have pushed that to 100 percent. The offset mechanism matters because it determines how much the GP profits from ancillary deal activity beyond the carry waterfall.

How Fund Expenses Expand to Fill the Space

Fund expenses are the category that absorbs costs the GP prefers not to run through its own P&L. The items that appear most frequently in audited K-1 schedules include deal sourcing costs on transactions that did not close, legal fees for fund-level matters, third-party valuation fees, insurance premiums carried at the fund level, and LP meeting travel costs. Each of these has a plausible structural justification. The question is scale and allocation.

The specific pressure point is broken deal costs. When a GP pursues an acquisition, spends on diligence and legal structuring, and the deal falls apart, those fees land somewhere. The LPA language on broken deal expenses varies considerably. Some agreements cap fund-level absorption; others are silent, which effectively means the fund absorbs all of it. A GP running an active sourcing strategy can generate material broken deal expense in a single vintage year, and that cost flows directly to LP net returns without touching the management fee line.

A second pattern worth watching is the allocation of shared services across multiple funds managed simultaneously. When a GP is running Fund III and Fund IV in parallel, expenses that arguably benefit the platform broadly, compliance costs, a new portfolio monitoring system, a data team, sometimes get allocated to the active fund rather than split across the GP entity and both funds. The LPA’s “fair and reasonable allocation” language is doing a lot of work, and it is rarely precise enough to prevent discretionary judgment calls that favor the GP.

Reading the K-1 With Structural Eyes

The K-1 itself will not itemize every fund expense in the way a P&L would. LPs who want granularity need to look at the annual audited financial statements, specifically the notes to the financial statements where expense categories are disclosed. The management fee income line in those financials, net of offsets, compared against actual fund-level operating expenses reveals whether the net cost of GP operations is tracking within original expectations.

The negotiating leverage on expense language sits entirely at the subscription stage. Once the LPA is signed, the GP’s discretion under existing language is largely defended. Advisory committee approval rights over unusual expenses are the primary check, where they exist.

The Operator Read

The structural observation is straightforward: the management fee is visible, benchmarked, and discussed in every LP pitch. The expense schedule is negotiated quietly and reviewed infrequently. Allocators treating these as two separate conversations, one at commitment and one at each annual audit, tend to have clearer pictures of true fund-level drag than those who model only the headline fee.

When a K-1 lands and the expense line looks wider than expected, most LPs absorb it without pressing. That’s the intended outcome. The structural ambiguity between what a GP absorbs through the management fee and what gets charged back to the fund as a fund expense is not accidental — it’s a negotiated grey zone that compounds quietly across vintage years.

What the Management Fee Is Actually Supposed to Cover

The management fee — typically 1.5% to 2% on committed capital during the investment period, stepping down on invested or net asset value thereafter — is conventionally understood to fund GP operations: salaries, rent, back-office infrastructure, deal sourcing overhead. The implicit contract is that LPs pay a flat fee and the GP runs its shop from that number.

In practice, fund documents rarely codify this cleanly. The LPA defines management fee income and then separately enumerates fund expenses — and the two lists do not always exhaust the universe of costs. What falls into the gap is subject to GP discretion and, frequently, to how much scrutiny the LP advisory committee exercises at fund formation.

The Expense Chargebacks That Move the Line

The categories LPs should read closely are organizational expenses, deal-related costs on broken transactions, legal fees for ongoing regulatory compliance, fund administration, and — increasingly — technology and data subscriptions framed as fund-level infrastructure. Each of these has a coherent argument for fund-level treatment. Each also has a coherent argument for inclusion in the management fee burden.

• Broken deal costs: Many LPAs allow 100% chargeback to the fund. Some cap at a fixed dollar amount or offset against management fee. The cap structure matters more than the category label.
• Organizational expenses: A $500,000 hard cap was once standard market practice. Formation costs on larger vehicles have quietly migrated upward; $1M–$2M caps now appear in mid-market fund documents without negotiation friction.
• Monitoring and transaction fees: Where the GP earns these from portfolio companies, the LP’s interest is in the offset rate — 80% or 100% credited against the management fee. A 50% offset on a high-fee deal-flow fund is a meaningful drag that won’t appear in headline fee disclosures.

Why the Line Moves Across Vintages

GP economics compress when AUM is flat or declining, when carry from prior vintages is underwater, or when the firm is investing in capabilities — compliance teams, ESG reporting infrastructure, LP portal technology — that can be plausibly characterized as fund-level services. The line between “GP overhead” and “fund expense” becomes elastic precisely when GP cash flow is under pressure.

Regulatory filings offer one signal. SEC-registered advisers disclose fee and expense practices in Form ADV Part 2A. Comparing the ADV language to the actual LPA drafting, and then to Schedule K-1 line items, surfaces inconsistencies that LP quarterly calls rarely surface organically. Institutional LPs with separate accounts or co-investment rights are often better positioned to see this data — a structural information asymmetry that smaller LPs rarely fully close.

The Operator Read

The K-1 is a lagging document. The time to read fund expense language is during LPA negotiation, not at tax time. LPs observing tighter GP margins on newer vintages are paying closer attention to “customary fund expenses” as a defined term — specifically whether the definition is exhaustive or illustrative. An illustrative list in the LPA is an open-ended authorization. Funds with LPAC oversight rights tied to expense approvals above a threshold offer a structural check that the document language alone does not.

Co-investment programs have become standard furniture in GP-LP relationships, but their presence on a term sheet resolves nothing. The same mechanism that genuinely extends LP economics can, with minor structural adjustments, serve primarily to reduce GP risk concentration while preserving management fee revenue. The difference lives in the details most LPs skim.

What Genuine Alignment Looks Like

A co-investment offer with real alignment typically surfaces on deals where the GP has already committed meaningful fund capital and is offering pro-rata participation at the same entry price, with no incremental management fee and a reduced or zero carry tier on the co-invest sleeve. The GP is, in effect, inviting the LP to sit alongside them on a position they already believe in enough to size from the main fund.

The structural signals worth tracking: the co-invest closing timeline mirrors the fund deal timeline (not a recycled secondary offering), the co-invest vehicle uses the same valuation methodology as the main fund, and the GP’s own balance sheet has meaningful exposure to the same asset. When those three conditions hold simultaneously, the offer is generally what it claims to be.

Where the Structure Starts Working Against You

The problematic variant tends to appear in one of two forms. The first is the “overflow” co-invest, where the GP has sourced a deal too large for the fund’s concentration limits and is effectively syndicating the excess to LPs who bear deal-specific risk without the portfolio diversification the fund structure provides. The management fee on the co-invest sleeve softens the GP’s economics on a deal they couldn’t fully absorb themselves.

The second form is subtler: co-invest rights offered predominantly on assets the GP has already marked up internally, often late in a fund’s cycle when the GP benefits from LP capital validating a higher carrying value. The LP gets exposure to an asset with compressed upside and the GP gets a supportive data point for the next fundraise. Neither fact will appear in the offer memo.

• No incremental management fee: Any co-invest sleeve charging a full or partial management fee deserves extra scrutiny on the rationale.
• Entry timing: Co-invests offered more than six months after initial fund deployment into the same asset warrant questions about what changed in the interim.
• GP balance sheet exposure: GPs with personal capital or GP commitment in the co-invest sleeve have a different incentive structure than those offering pure third-party syndication.
• Information rights: Co-invest vehicles that lack independent board observation or information rights create asymmetric information between the GP and co-investing LP.

The Negotiating Leverage Most LPs Leave on the Table

LPs with sufficient commitment size can negotiate co-investment rights with advance notice minimums, typically 10 to 15 business days, which meaningfully changes the analytical process available before a closing deadline. Compressed timelines on co-invests are not accidental; they limit the LP’s ability to conduct independent diligence on an asset the GP has been studying for months.

A right of first refusal on co-invest allocations, tied to pro-rata fund commitment, is also a negotiable term that larger LPs frequently do not request. GPs with strong deal flow typically prefer a small group of reliable co-invest partners over a broad syndication process, which creates more room for structural conversation than most LPs assume.

The Operator Read

Co-investment programs are worth having in an LP agreement, but the value is entirely structural, not cosmetic. The question is not whether the right exists but under what conditions it activates, on what terms, and on which vintage of assets. Operators who treat co-invest rights as a negotiating outcome rather than a relationship courtesy tend to find the economics considerably more interesting when the opportunity actually arrives.

Most limited partners sign the partnership agreement, wire the capital, and assume the LP Advisory Committee is a functional governance layer. It is, sometimes. More often it is a consent mechanism dressed as oversight, and understanding the difference has real implications for how sophisticated allocators read a fund relationship.

What the LPAC Actually Does

The LPAC’s formal mandate is narrow. It approves conflicts of interest, waives certain provisions of the limited partnership agreement, and in some structures, values hard-to-price assets when the GP faces a conflict doing so itself. It does not set strategy. It does not approve portfolio company acquisitions. It rarely has removal rights over the GP without cause, and “cause” in most LP agreements requires fraud or criminal conviction, not persistent underperformance.

Membership is drawn from anchor LPs, typically those above a size threshold written into the LPA. A $500M fund might seat LPs who committed $25M or more. That creates an immediate structural skew: the committee represents the largest check-writers, not the LP base as a whole, and those large LPs frequently have their own GP relationships, co-investment appetites, and future fund access to protect.

The Votes That Carry Real Consequence

The consequential approvals cluster in three areas. First, conflicted transactions: a GP selling an asset from Fund II into Fund III, or a continuation vehicle where the same GP sits on both sides of the trade. Second, valuations of assets the GP has a direct interest in marking a particular direction. Third, extensions of the fund’s investment period or term, which affect when LPs see distributions and whether the GP continues drawing management fees.

• Cross-fund transactions are where LPAC scrutiny matters most. The structural incentive for a GP to move an asset between vehicles at a favorable price is obvious, and the LPAC approval requirement exists specifically here.
• Continuation vehicles have elevated this tension considerably since 2019. An LPAC approving a CV transaction is, in effect, approving the GP’s right to extend its economic interest in the best assets while offering liquidity to those who want out. The conflict is inherent and the approval process varies widely in rigor.
• Term extensions are often approved without significant pushback, partly because the alternative, a forced wind-down, is worse for everyone, but partly because LPAC members lack the bandwidth for a protracted dispute.

The Politics Underneath the Process

LPAC members are not disinterested arbiters. A large pension fund on the committee is also evaluating whether to commit to the GP’s next fund. A family office seat-holder may be receiving co-investment deal flow. These relationships do not produce corrupt outcomes automatically, but they produce outcomes shaped by relationship economics, not pure fiduciary calculus.

The GP, meanwhile, controls the information flow entirely. The LPAC receives what the GP prepares. Independent third-party fairness opinions are sometimes obtained for large CV transactions, but there is no structural requirement in most standard LPAs, and “independent” in practice often means a firm with other GP relationships in the market.

Some of the more institutionally sophisticated LPs have begun negotiating enhanced LPAC provisions at the fund formation stage: independent valuation rights, information rights that go beyond the standard quarterly package, and explicit recusal mechanics when a committee member has a direct conflict. These provisions exist but are not market standard.

The Operator Read

Allocators who want the LPAC to function as governance rather than rubber-stamp need to negotiate the charter before signing the LPA, not after. The leverage window is subscription. Once capital is committed, the GP controls the agenda, the timing, and the information. LPAC composition, quorum requirements, and approval thresholds are all negotiable points at formation that most LPs treat as boilerplate. The ones who treat them as structural terms tend to have a different experience when a conflicted transaction eventually arrives, and it always does.

Every private fund has a public set of terms and a private set of agreements running underneath them. The side letter is where the real negotiation lives, and the distance between what a first-close LP receives and what a late, smaller LP receives can be structurally significant, regardless of what the fund documents say about equal treatment.

How the Stratification Works

Side letters are bilateral agreements between a GP and a specific LP, negotiated outside the Limited Partnership Agreement. They grant rights the LPA does not: reduced management fees, carried interest carve-outs, co-investment rights with reduced or zero carry, enhanced information packages, excuse rights from specific investments, and key-person triggered redemption options. A large sovereign wealth fund or pension anchor LP entering at first close typically negotiates a package covering most of these categories. A family office entering the same fund at second close on standard terms receives none of them by default.

The practical effect is a two-class fund structure operating under a single legal wrapper. Both LPs hold units with identical economic exposure to the underlying portfolio. Their governance rights, fee loads, and information access diverge considerably.

What MFN Actually Provides

Most Favored Nation clauses are the mechanism offered to smaller or mid-tier LPs as a nominal equalizer. An MFN provision entitles the LP to elect into any more favorable terms subsequently granted to another LP in the same fund, provided those terms are comparable in kind. The operative phrase is “comparable in kind.” GPs routinely structure anchor LP rights as compensation for commitments above a defined threshold, making those rights technically ineligible for MFN election by smaller LPs who did not meet the threshold. The MFN clause holds; the economics of the clause are hollowed out by the threshold architecture surrounding it.

A standard MFN notice period runs 30 to 60 days post-close, requiring the LP to affirmatively elect into available terms. LPs that do not have internal processes to review side letter disclosures within that window forfeit the option. The right exists; it goes unexercised.

The Information Asymmetry Underneath

Most LPAs include confidentiality provisions preventing LPs from disclosing the terms of their own side letters to co-investors. The GP, by contrast, holds visibility across all bilateral agreements. This creates a structural information asymmetry: the GP knows the full distribution of LP rights; each LP knows only its own. Secondary market buyers and fund-of-funds investors frequently underwrite this risk without sufficient data, since side letter obligations typically transfer with the interest but are not always fully disclosed in secondary transactions.

• Co-investment rights granted via side letter do not automatically bind a successor GP after a key-person event unless explicitly drafted to survive.
• Excuse rights, if exercised, can alter a fund’s capital call sequencing and affect unfunded commitment ratios for other LPs.
• Enhanced reporting rights negotiated by one LP may not trigger disclosure obligations to the broader LP base under ILPA guidelines unless the fund has adopted them by reference.

The Operator Read

For LPs evaluating a fund commitment, the side letter negotiation is not a post-subscription formality. It is where the actual terms of participation are set. The LPA establishes the floor; the side letter determines where a given LP actually sits relative to that floor and relative to every other LP in the vehicle. Capital allocators who treat side letter review as legal overhead rather than commercial negotiation are effectively accepting a subordinate position in a hierarchy they may not fully see. The structural setup rewards those who enter the conversation early, negotiate specifically, and understand what MFN thresholds actually permit them to elect into before signing.

There is a structural difference between owning a position in a private equity fund and owning a percentage of the firm that manages it. The first gives you exposure to a portfolio of companies. The second gives you a claim on management fees, carried interest distributions, and the enterprise value of the GP itself. GP-stakes investing is the institutionalization of that distinction.

How the Structure Actually Works

A GP-stakes fund acquires minority equity interests, typically between 10% and 30%, in established alternative asset managers. In exchange, the target GP receives permanent or long-dated capital, often used for co-investment obligations, seed capital for new strategies, or principal buyouts from retiring founders. The stakes fund receives a pro-rata share of the GP economics going forward.

Those economics have two components. Management fees, usually 1.5% to 2% on committed or invested capital, are contractual and largely recession-resistant since they are not mark-to-market in the same way asset values are. Carried interest, the 20% performance allocation on profits above the hurdle, is contingent and lumpy, but in mature firms with consistent deployment and realization cycles, it becomes a predictable cash flow category over a full vintage horizon. The combination produces a blended cash flow profile that operators in real estate or software would recognize: stable recurring revenue underlaid by backend upside.

Why the Category Attracted Institutional Capital

Allocators added GP stakes for several structural reasons that are worth separating from the marketing narrative. First, AUM growth at established alternatives managers has historically compounded independent of individual fund performance, because successful managers raise successor funds regardless of whether Fund III outperformed Fund II. The fee base scales with AUM, not with returns. Second, GP stakes provide exposure to the alternatives industry itself, a category that has grown from roughly $4 trillion to over $13 trillion in AUM over the past fifteen years, without requiring the allocator to pick winning underlying funds. Third, the minority position structure means the stakes investor typically does not take operational control, keeping the incentive alignment of the founding partners intact.

The earliest dedicated vehicles in this space, including Dyal Capital (now Blue Owl) and Petershill at Goldman Sachs, demonstrated that mid-sized to large alternative managers were willing to monetize partial GP equity without compromising independence. That proof of concept opened the market to a broader set of buyers and sellers.

The Structural Risks the Category Carries

The category is not without its friction points. Carried interest distributions are illiquid until realizations occur, and realization timelines in private markets have extended materially over the past three years as exit markets tightened. Minority stakes also carry limited downside protection: if a GP experiences key-person departures or underperforms through a vintage cycle, the stakes investor has little structural recourse. Valuing the stakes themselves is an exercise in assumptions about future fundraising trajectories, fund performance, and discount rates applied to contingent cash flows.

• AUM concentration risk is real: several prominent GP-stakes targets derive the majority of their economics from one or two flagship strategies.
• Management fee compression is a secular risk as LPs push back on fee structures across alternatives.
• Successor fund risk applies when the founding generation exits and brand continuity is untested.

The Operator Read

The structural logic of GP stakes is legible to anyone who has ever owned a business with a management contract attached to it. You are acquiring a royalty on intellectual capital and brand, not on any specific underlying asset. The durable firms in this category are those with diversified AUM across strategies and vintage years, strong junior partnership pipelines, and performance records across at least one full cycle. Operators evaluating this category are looking past the fund brochure at the firm’s organizational chart and fundraising history, which is the correct frame.